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Does Nonprofit Status Signal Quality?
Anup Malani and Guy David
ABSTRACT
A popular theory for why firms take nonprofit status is that it is a signal of quality. This paper
offers a simple, empirical test of this theory. If nonprofit status signals quality, surely nonprofit
firms would want to ensure that consumers are aware of this. A natural way for firms to do
this is to indicate their nonprofit status in their advertising. Taking this cue, we conducted
a survey of over 2,800 firms in the hospital, nursing home, or child care industries in order
to determine whether nonprofit firms communicate their status to consumers on their Web
sites or yellow pages listings. We find that fewer than 7.5 percent of nonprofit firms signal
their status in yellow pages listings, only 25 percent do so on their home pages, and 30
percent do so on their about-us pages. Indeed, over 35 percent never signal their nonprofit
status on their Web sites. Our evidence does not support the hypothesis that nonprofit status
is a signal of quality.
1. INTRODUCTION
Why do firms take nonprofit status? The literature on law and economics
and the theory of the firm has offered four major theories. First, pro-
moters1 who have quasi-altruistic motives, such as providing high-
quality service, take nonprofit status to financially support that motive
1. Because a nonprofit firm, unlike a for-profit firm, does not technically have an owner,
we will refer to the would-be owners as principals, promoters, or entrepreneurs.
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(Newhouse 1970; Lakdawalla and Philipson 1998). Second, nonprofit
firms address unsatisfied demand for government-funded provision of
certain public goods (Weisbrod 1975). Third, some profit-maximizing
firms take nonprofit status simply because it promises a tax subsidy; this
is smugly called the for-profit-in-disguise model.2
The fourth and most popular theory in the literature, however, is that
firms take nonprofit status because that status is a signal of quality
(Hansmann 1980, 1996; Easley and O’Hara 1983; Weisbrod and Schles-
inger 1985; Hirth 1999; Glaeser and Shleifer 2001; and see Malani,
Philipson, and David [2003] for positive citations to the signaling the-
ory). The theory starts with the premise that there are certain product
or service markets in which consumers and producers may be able to
contract over quantity but not quality. The reason may be that the
consumer cannot observe product quality (nonobservability) or prove
to a court that the agreed-on quality was not provided (nonverifiability).
In these markets, profit-maximizing firms have an incentive to shirk on
quality in order to reduce costs and increase take-home profits. Non-
profit status is a solution because it removes the profit incentive.3 On
the margin, cost-cutting through the reduction of noncontractible quality
will not increase the nonprofit principal’s take-home pay. Therefore, she
has no incentive to shirk in this manner. From the consumer’s perspec-
tive, then, nonprofit status is a signal that a firm will provide the non-
contractible quality it promises.4
2. This theory raises two questions: why would a profit maximizer take nonprofit status
and why do all firms not take advantage of the nonprofit subsidy? The answer to the first
is that nonprofit status allows employees to take home profits in the form of competitive
wages; only the distribution of what economists call rents is prohibited. This is the so-
called nondistribution constraint. The answer to the second question could be that prin-
cipals of firms with a cost advantage might offer a take-home pay (that is, rents after
corporate income taxes) that is greater than competitive wages. Alternatively, some firms
may be better able to evade the nondistribution constraint through the use of perquisites
(David 2004).
3. The signaling theory posits that all firms are at least partially profit maximizing.
Some take nonprofit status because doing so maximizes profits. They distribute those profits
in the form of perquisites. Because perquisites are an imperfect substitute for cash, their
distributions still reduce profit incentives and thus the incentive to shirk on noncontractible
quality.
4. A related theory is that firms choose nonprofit status not to signal to consumers
that they will not shirk but to signal to workers that they will not shirk on terms of
employment or work conditions (Francois 2000).
This content downloaded from 130.091.116.052 on June 06, 2016 06:40:59 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
N O N P R O F I T S TAT U S A N D Q U A L I T Y / 553
The purpose of this paper is to test empirically this signaling theory.5
Direct tests of whether nonprofit firms produce greater noncontractible
quality are impossible if product quality is nonobservable. If product
quality is merely nonverifiable, it is still likely that a researcher will have
difficulty measuring that quality for the same reasons a court would. In
any case there is an exhaustive literature on whether nonprofit firms
produce higher quality than do for-profit firms. Recent systematic re-
views find the evidence inconclusive (Ortmann and Schlesinger 2003;
Schlesinger and Gray 2005; Malani, Philipson, and David 2003; Sloan
2000).
Direct surveys of whether consumers think nonprofit firms are more
trustworthy are available, but their conclusions are mixed. Schlesinger,
Mitchell, and Gray (2004) reviewed surveys between 1985 and 2000
and found that, although roughly two-thirds of respondents see non-
profit hospitals as more trustworthy,6 a majority of respondents also
thought for-profit hospitals provided higher quality care, and one-third
of respondents were unable to provide a coherent definition of nonprofit
ownership. More important, it is unclear whether surveys actually mea-
sure true and strongly held beliefs or just cheap talk. None reviewed by
5. For a theoretical critique of signaling theory, see Ortmann and Schlesinger (2003).
They argue, among other things, that the theory mistakenly assumes that the nondistri-
bution constraint is well enforced and that nonprofit status may remove the profit incentive
but in its place promoters may substitute a preference for something other than quality,
such as laziness. (The authors also review the empirical literature on the theory, but that
analysis often appears to confuse the signaling theory with the altruism theory of Newhouse
[1970] and Lakdawalla and Philipson [1998].) In addition, Malani (2001) notes that there
are many different signals of quality besides organizational form. These include malpractice
liability, report cards, and reputation. A challenge for the quality-signaling theory of non-
profit status is explaining why it persists in the presence of alternative signals of quality
(and vice versa). A general criticism of all the major economic theories of nonprofit status
is that they do not explain why the law allows only certain firms in certain markets to
take nonprofit status and why the law grants the sorts of tax benefits (and imposes the
sorts of tax costs, as Malani and Choi [2005] note) that it does. For instance, critics of
the signaling theory might ask: why are firms in other markets with noncontractible quality
not allowed to take nonprofit status? That is, why are lawyers or auto mechanics not
allowed to take nonprofit status?
6. Notably, Mauser (1993) surveyed parents of children in nonprofit day care centers
and Towers Perrin (1995) surveyed consumers in the process of choosing health care plans,
and they found that 25 and 46 percent of respondents, respectively, said they trusted
nonprofit firms more than for-profit firms. However, a 1996 survey by the Roper Center
for Public Opinion Research at the University of Connecticut found that its respondents
were evenly split between those who trusted and those who distrusted nonprofit firms
(Ortmann and Schlesinger 2003, p. 99).
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Schlesinger, Mitchell, and Gray correlate responses to actual consumer
decisions.
The economics literature has produced two indirect but creative tests
of the signaling theory, but neither study is determinative. The first,
Philipson (2000), begins with the observation that if nonprofit status
signals higher noncontractible quality, then consumers should be willing
to pay and a nonprofit firm should be able to charge a higher price than
a for-profit firm, holding constant all observable features of the two
firms. Philipson uses data from the nursing home industry to test this
prediction but finds no statistically significant difference between the
prices of nonprofit and for-profit homes. His finding, however, is of
limited value. The nursing home industry is subject to a myriad of price,
quantity, and quality regulations that render price data unreliable.7
A second study that tests the signaling theory is Chou (2002). Chou
examines the quality of care—as measured by various health outcomes—
that nonprofit and for-profit nursing homes provide to two populations
of nursing home residents: one that has the assistance of family members
to monitor the quality of the home and one that does not. The latter
population is said to suffer from asymmetric information vis-a`-vis the
home. Chou finds that nonprofits provide better quality care than for-
profits to residents without family but no better care than for-profits to
residents with family. Although Chou’s study is revealing, it has some
shortcomings. For example, many of the health outcomes examined are
verifiable, and Chou does not control for price. More puzzling, however,
is that the population that suffers from asymmetric information does
not appear to seek out nonprofit homes despite their superior perfor-
mance.8
Our paper adds to this literature a relatively more direct and what
we hope is a more compelling test of the signaling theory. If nonprofit
status signals quality, surely nonprofit firms would want to ensure that
7. Regulations include Medicare financing and thus price setting and quality regulation
for skilled nursing facilities, state certificate-of-need laws, and medical malpractice liability.
For further commentary on Philipson’s empirical work (2000), see Vogt (2000). For em-
pirical work along the lines of Philipson’s but challenging the signaling-to-worker hypoth-
esis of Francois (2000), see Leete (2001). Leete surveys wages of 1.4 million workers in
industries with mixed nonprofit and for-profit production in 1990 and finds that nonprofit
workers make more than for-profit workers in half the industries and less than for-profit
workers in the other half of industries.
8. Evidence regarding the outcomes of residents with and without asymmetric infor-
mation at nonprofit homes is not offered either. This information would offer another way
to determine the credibility of the study’s findings.
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consumers are aware of their nonprofit status. A simple way facilities
could broadcast such a signal would be to add it to their names (for
example, the Ravenswood Nonprofit Hospital or the Edgewater Non-
profit Nursing Home). This sort of signaling is unheard of. Assuming
that this fact by itself does not sink the signaling theory, one might
suppose that firms would take other steps to signal their status when it
is not otherwise obvious. For example, they might indicate their non-
profit status on their Web site or in yellow pages advertisements. Taking
this cue, we conduct a survey of over 1,800 nonprofit hospital and
nursing home firms’ Web sites and yellow pages advertisements. We also
conduct a survey of nearly 1,000 yellow pages advertisements in the day
care industry. The goal is to determine whether nonprofit firms signal
their status—a fundamental assumption of the signaling theory.9
We conclude that there is little direct support for the hypothesis that
nonprofit status signals quality. We infer this from the fact that less than
7.5 percent of nonprofit firms signal their status in yellow pages adver-
tisements, only 25 percent do so on their home pages, and 30 percent
do so on their about-us pages. Indeed, over 35 percent never signal their
nonprofit status.
The remainder of this paper may be outlined as follows. Section 2
justifies our test of the signaling hypothesis. Section 3 presents our sam-
pling design and summarizes our data. Section 4 reports the results of
our empirical analysis. The conclusion discusses the limitations of our
study and suggestions for future research.
2. Test
We propose to test the signaling theory by examining whether nonprofit
facilities in three markets—the hospital, nursing home, and child care
markets—indicate their nonprofit status on their Web pages and in their
yellow pages listings. The power of this test depends roughly on four
9. Two related studies attempt to determine if consumers are aware of the nonprofit
status of firms. First, Mauser (1993) surveyed parents of children in nonprofit day care
centers. Only 56 percent of parents were able to correctly identify that their day care center
was nonprofit, and only 14 percent said this was an important consideration in their choice
of day care center. Second, the Roper Center conducted an opinion poll after a series of
scandals occurred at Columbia/HCA, a for-profit hospital chain. Thirty percent of re-
spondents incorrectly identified the chain as nonprofit, 12 percent correctly identified it as
for profit, and the rest stated that they did not know. Although both studies suggest that
consumers are not aware of the nonprofit status of firms, the results are not terribly com-
pelling because Mauser does not survey for-profits and the Roper Center survey does not
focus on consumers and would-be consumers of Columbia/HCA.
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assumptions about purchasing in these markets. First, consumers choose
the hospital, nursing home, or child care center they patronize. Second,
consumers value not just quantity but also quality in these markets, and
they seek information on this quality. Third, consumers in these markets
utilize Web pages and/or yellow pages as sources of information on the
quality of facilities. Finally, the cost of mentioning a facility’s nonprofit
status on a Web site or in a yellow pages listing is less than the value
of the signal to the firm’s revenue or, better, the costs are trivial. Under
these assumptions, the signaling theory predicts that the nonprofit fa-
cilities in each of the three markets will communicate their nonprofit
status on their Web pages and in their yellow pages listings. If they do
not, then the data do not validate the signaling theory.
It is reasonable to suppose that these assumptions are satisfied. It is
not controversial that consumer choice is relevant in nursing home and
child care markets, although the elderly may rely on their adult children
as agents in the former market. There is also growing evidence that
whereas patient admission into hospitals was previously driven entirely
by physician recommendation, it is now driven by a combination of
physician recommendation and patients’ personal choices (McMillan
1981; Kurz and Wolinsky 1985; Christensen and Inguanzo 1989; An-
daleeb 1994; Endresen and Wintz 2002). Indeed Bell and Vitaska (1992)
report that patients are more likely to feel that advertisements influence
their choice of hospital than physicians are to feel that advertisements
influence their choice of hospital for patients.
Nor is it controversial that patients care about and seek information
on quality in these markets. For example, a recent HealthGrades Inc.
survey (HealthGrades 2004) found that 40 percent of consumers con-
sider a hospital’s quality ratings in making their hospital choice. Further
evidence is the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Service’s (CMS) in-
vestment in the Hospital Quality Initiative, which is focused mainly on
providing information on quality to consumers.
There is evidence that consumers rely on Web pages or yellow pages
for information on quality, although most of this evidence focuses on
the hospital industry. As a general matter, Andaleeb (1994) finds that
patients are increasingly aware of hospital advertising (and that this
advertising drives patient decision making). With respect to the use of
Web sites, Jensen (2005) interviewed three hospital marketing executives
and found that a growing proportion of patients actively seek out hos-
pital information via the Internet and act on it. According to Haugh
(2004), survey data show that more than 10.3 million online consumers
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used a hospital Web site in the third quarter of 2003. Patients also report
that the Internet is the second most convenient resource (behind their
doctors) for access to health information. Finally, according to the Hos-
pital Internet Marketing Report, 99 percent of hospitals have active Web
sites, and 82 percent use them for marketing purposes (Romano 2003).
To obtain data on yellow pages use, we interviewed the marketing
directors of three hospitals, two in Boston and one in Washington, D.C.10
They indicated that, although yellow pages advertising is not a top pri-
ority and does not take up a serious portion of their budget, it is in-
evitably undertaken because it is expected by consumers and employed
by all their competitors. The director of one of the Boston hospitals
indicated that advertising in the yellow pages is cost-effective, although
“most people are moving toward the Web as a resource for telephone
and address info and these options are free of charge.” What is more
interesting, all three directors stated that, all else being equal, they would
include their nonprofit status in their advertisements regardless of the
medium because they felt consumers view that information favorably.
(That having been said, none of the directors, when asked, knew if their
current yellow pages ads actually had mentioned their nonprofit status.)
The final assumption behind our proposed test concerns the costs of
signaling on a Web site or in the yellow pages. The fixed costs of setting
up and the annual costs of maintaining a hospital’s entire Web site can
be large. For example, Romano (2003) found that setting up a low-end
Web site can cost a hospital $100,000, and maintaining a large academic
center’s Web site can cost $1–$2 million per year. Indeed, the Children’s
Hospital of Philadelphia invested approximately $16 million to overhaul
its Web site in 2001 (Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia 2001). Even
one of the marketing directors we personally interviewed stated that
updating the content of his Boston hospital’s entire Web site costs
roughly $100,000 per year. These numbers appear daunting, but they
tell us the costs of entire Web sites, not the cost of narrowly modifying
a Web site to include a reference to the hospital’s nonprofit status. The
cost of such a reference is a tiny fraction of the total expense of the Web
site. The primary drivers of the cost of a nonprofit reference are space
constraints, which in turn are a function of the attention spans of Web
site viewers. Intuitively, the costs are highest on a Web site’s home page,
10. The marketing director of one of the Boston hospitals requested that the hospital
not be named. The other Boston hospital is Faulkner Hospital, and the Washington, D.C.,
hospital is the Howard University Hospital.
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Table 1. Yellow Book USA Advertising Rates in Dollars,
July 2006
Full
Page
Quarter
Page
Five
Lines
Boston 2,579 689 130
Denver 2,788 766 136
Phoenix 3,025 930 140
Richmond, Virginia 1,685 455 70
which is typically no larger than one computer screen. The costs are
lower on the about-us page, which can be several scrollable computer
screens long. Conditional on location, the costs of making a nonprofit
reference are no different than the costs of providing other quality sig-
nals, such as information on accreditations, religious affiliations, and
academic affiliations or quotes from satisfied consumers.
In order to obtain evidence on the cost of a yellow pages advertise-
ment, we contacted Yellow Book USA in July 2006. It quoted for us
monthly rates for full-page, quarter-page, and five-line advertisements
for four representative cities covered in our data (see Table 1). A sales
representative for the yellow pages in Philadelphia quoted us rates that
are roughly in line with, though at the top of, this range: $3,331 per
month for a full-page, $554 per month for a quarter-page, and $85 per
month for a five-line advertisement. While we find price variation across
cities, the magnitude of the expenditure for even a full-page advertise-
ment is very small from the perspective of any hospital in our sample.
This was confirmed in our interviews with hospital marketing directors.
Before we proceed to apply our test, we note that one must be cau-
tious when interpreting our results. Even if one finds—as we do—that
nonprofit facilities frequently do not communicate their nonprofit status
on their Web sites or in yellow pages listings, that does not imply that
the signaling theory is disproved. At best it is evidence that the signaling
theory cannot explain communications between certain nonprofit facil-
ities and consumers on the former’s Web sites and yellow pages listings.
The more cautious interpretation reflects the possibility that there are
explanations that can reconcile the signaling theory and our findings.
Perhaps (notwithstanding the evidence from Bell and Vitaska [1992])
the target audience for hospital Web sites are doctors rather than pa-
tients, that doctors already know the nonprofit status of hospitals, and
that doctors tell patients this information so hospitals do not have to.
It is also possible that consumers get information on nonprofit status
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from media that this paper does not examine, such as television, radio,
newspapers, or magazines. Finally, it may be that some patients view
nonprofit status as a signal of quality while others view it as a signal of
inefficiency. If advertisements cannot discriminate between these two
types of patients, hospitals may not find it profitable to communicate
their nonprofit status in advertisements. With these admitted limitations
of our test, we proceed to the discussion of the data we analyze.
3. DATA
We collect data from three industries. The first is the hospital industry.
For this industry we gather data about Web sites and yellow pages
listings. The Web site data are a stratified sample of roughly 900 hos-
pitals. The sampling methodology is as follows. We gathered the universe
of hospitals from the 2003 American Hospital Association (AHA) annual
survey. From each state we randomly drew 20 nonprofit hospitals. (Non-
profit status was verified from the AHA data. If there were fewer than
20, we took as many as we could find.) From this subsample we deter-
mined those that did and did not have Web sites. Of those that did, we
checked whether the hospitals indicated that they were nonprofit on
their home page, their about-us page, anywhere else on the Web site, or
not at all. (We also determined whether the hospitals indicated if they
were religious or academically affiliated on their Web sites.) We merged
these data with AHA data on various hospital characteristics.
We also gathered data on yellow pages listings in this industry. For
these data we gathered 2002 yellow pages for 10 medium-sized cities:
Boston, Denver, Milwaukee, Oklahoma City, Phoenix, Providence
(Rhode Island), Richmond (Virginia), Sacramento, Seattle, and Wash-
ington, D.C. From these yellow pages, we randomly sampled roughly
10 nonprofit hospitals per city. We checked whether these hospitals in-
dicated if they were nonprofit or religious in their yellow pages listings.
For the most part, we replicated this methodology for gathering Web
site and yellow pages data for the nursing home industry. The salient
differences in methodology are, first, that the universe of nursing homes
was gathered from the CMS Web site.11 (Nonprofit status was verified
from the CMS data.) Second, the Web site signals data were merged
11. See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Med-
icaid Services, Medicare: Nursing Home Compare (http://www.medicare.gov/NHCompare/
home.asp).
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with nursing home characteristic data from the Provider of Services file
for fourth quarter 2002.
The third industry we examine is child care (or day care). Because
these firms rarely have Web sites, we focus our analysis on their yellow
pages listings in the 10 cities listed above. There is no source that pro-
vides the universe of child care providers and informs us which are
nonprofit. Therefore, we sampled roughly 100 firms with yellow pages
listings in each city. We called each provider to determine its nonprofit
status, its religious orientation, and whether it was state certified. Then
we checked whether those that indicated they were nonprofit, religious,
or state certified on the phone indicated this information in their yellow
pages listings.
Our Web site data are fairly representative of the nonprofit universe.
In the hospital data, although we slightly oversample facilities in the
West and smaller facilities (especially those that are also religious), these
discrepancies basically disappear when the unit of analysis (or weighting)
is beds in nonprofit facilities. In the nursing home data, we oversample
facilities in the South and the West, but doing so does not cause any
disparity in the distribution of beds relative to the universe of nursing
homes.
Table 2 provides summary statistics from the Web site samples for
the hospital and nursing home industries.12 (Data from each facility are
weighted by the probability of sampling a bed from that facility out of
the universe of all beds in nonprofit facilities in the state where that
facility resides. This is the practice throughout, unless otherwise indi-
cated.) Although overall 39 percent of hospital beds and 74 percent of
nursing home beds are in for-profit facilities, keep in mind that our
sample contains no for-profit facilities. Our goal is to explore whether
nonprofit facilities signal their status, not to compare nonprofit and for-
profit behavior. Facilities lacking Web sites are excluded from our anal-
ysis; this removes 17 percent of sampled hospitals and 19 percent of
sampled nursing homes. Although the decision not to have a Web site
includes the decision not to signal a facility’s status on a Web site, we
ignore that decision on the basis of our prior belief that the decision to
signal status did not motivate the decision to maintain a Web site.
Hospitals are roughly twice as large as nursing homes in our sample.
12. The statistics are weighted by the number of hospital or nursing home beds in
each state, as appropriate. Alternative weighting schemes might focus on facilities or on
beds in nonprofit facilities only. Our findings are not, however, sensitive to our use or
choice of weights.
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Only a fraction of facilities are specialized: 7 percent of hospitals are
not general hospitals, 3 percent of nursing homes are self-standing skilled
nursing facilities, and 15 percent of homes focus on care for the mentally
disabled. Over one-half of hospitals and 40 percent of nursing homes
are part of a system (or network) of such facilities.
Examining attributes that are plausibly quality related, we find that
17 percent of hospitals are religious, just over 10 percent of hospitals
are teaching facilities, and a quarter have resident training programs.
We check if hospitals are part of a Blue Cross/Blue Shield (hereafter,
Blue Cross) health plan because these plans impose some quality regu-
lations on participating facilities. We also check if facilities report that
they have a long-term plan to improve the quality of care they provide
or cooperate with local agencies to improve the health of their com-
munities. Over 90 percent of facilities indicate Blue Cross participation,
a long-term plan, or a community orientation. As for nursing homes,
nearly a quarter are religious, and 70 percent report Blue Cross partic-
ipation.
Turning to Web sites, two-thirds and three-fifths of hospitals and
nursing homes, respectively, operate their own sites. The remainder em-
ploy their system’s Web sites. The two types of facilities have remarkably
similar patterns of nonprofit signaling. The home page is the most prom-
inent place that nonprofit status is indicated for 20–25 percent of fa-
cilities. For a third, the about-us page is the most prominent placement.
Overall, roughly 65 percent of facilities of each type indicate their status
somewhere on their Web sites.
Table 3 provides summary statistics from the yellow pages samples
for all three industries we study. The information we gathered focuses
on attributes that might bear upon the quality of service. For example,
roughly a quarter of nonprofit hospitals and nursing homes and two-
fifths of nonprofit child care providers13 are religious. Nearly three-
quarters of hospitals are academic or have an academic affiliation.14 Only
3 percent of nonprofit child care providers are state certified.
13. Our random sampling of nonprofit and for-profit listings suggests that just under
one-half of child care providers are nonprofit.
14. The difference in rates of academic status in the Web site and yellow pages sample
can partly be explained by the fact that the yellow pages sample focuses on medium-sized
cities, which have a higher concentration of academic medical centers than does the average
community.
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Table 3. Summary Data on Yellow Pages Listings
Hospitals
Nursing
Homes
Child Care Providers
Nonprofit
For-
Profit All
Number of facilities 80 97 467 519 986
Accreditation:
Number of facilities 13 30 43
Fraction of all facilities 2.8 5.8 4.4
Accreditation in listing:
Number of facilities 9 24 33
Fraction of all accredited facilities 69 80 77
Religious affiliation:
Number of facilities 22 23 185 17 202
Fraction of all facilities 27.5 23.7 39.6 3.3 20.5
Religious affiliation in listing:
Number of facilities 22 6 104 8 112
Fraction of all religious facilities 100.0 26.1 56 47 55
Academic status or affiliation:
Number of facilities 59
Fraction of all facilities 73.8
Academic status/affiliation in listing:
Number of facilities 12
Fraction of all academic facilities 20.3
Nonprofit status in listing 2 7 13
Fraction with nonprofit status in listing 2.5 7.2 2.8
Note. Ten medium-sized cities were surveyed: Boston, Denver, Milwaukee, Oklahoma
City, Phoenix, Providence (Rhode Island), Richmond (Virginia), Sacramento, Seattle, and
Washington, D.C. A hospital is tagged as academically affiliated if it is associated with a
medical school in the American Hospital Association data. Data are from 2002.
4. RESULTS
Our analysis begins by inquiring into the frequency with which nonprofit
firms fail to communicate their status. Table 2 reveals that nearly 40
percent of hospitals and 26 percent of nursing homes do not indicate
their nonprofit status anywhere on their Web sites. The last row of Table
3 provides even stronger evidence against nonprofit signaling. Over 97
percent of nonprofit hospitals and child care providers and nearly 93
percent of nonprofit nursing homes fail to indicate their status in yellow
pages listings.
In the Web site data, we draw a distinction between the home page,
the about-us page, and other pages because of the different purposes of
and constraints on these sites. The home page is the first page all visitors
see and acts as a guide to the rest of the Web site. It therefore has the
most viewers and the least substantive content. This page is typically
just one page long and contains only information the firm wants all
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viewers to see. The about-us page is viewed by fewer visitors; they have
to navigate their way there from the home page. This page is typically
longer because the viewers of the page are more motivated to find in-
formation and are patient enough to read a longer Web page. The re-
mainder of the Web site is more like the about-us page but perhaps has
fewer visitors. The important feature for our purposes is the limited
space on the home page relative to that on the about-us page. This means
that quality signals on the home page are more valuable or important
in the firm’s eyes than those on the about-us page. There are even fewer
signals on other Web pages than on the about-us page not because of
space constraints but because of topic limitations. The home page and
the about-us page are where consumers expect and firms place quality-
related information. The reader can confirm this by navigating to any
given hospital or nursing home’s Web page, as we have done. On the
basis of where they indicate their nonprofit status on their Web sites, it
does not appear that hospitals or nursing homes view nonprofit status
to be an important signal of quality. Among hospitals, only 18 and 28
percent indicate their nonprofit status on their home page or about-us
page, respectively. Among nursing homes, the numbers are 26 and 31
percent, respectively.
It might be useful when evaluating these numbers to have a baseline
for how much firms communicate other quality-related characteristics.
One possible baseline is communication of religious affiliation. While it
could be argued that religious affiliation does not indicate quality of
service in the same way that nonprofit status does, religious status does
likely indicate something about the values of a facility, values that may
affect the demand of a certain segment of consumers. Table 2 reveals
that only 28 and 14 percent of religious hospitals and nursing homes,
respectively, fail to indicate their religious affiliation on their Web pages.
Table 3 indicates that no religious hospitals and fewer than half of
religious child care providers fail to indicate their religious affiliation in
their yellow pages listings. Although religious nursing homes indicate
their affiliation only 26 percent of the time in yellow pages listings, they
indicate their religious affiliation 86 percent of the time on their Web
sites, and even 26 percent is larger than the anemic 7 percent or lower
rate for communication of nonprofit status in yellow pages listings. The
sense that religious signals are more frequent than nonprofit signals is
reinforced in the locational analysis of Web site signals. Religious hos-
pitals indicate their religious affiliation on their home page 70 percent
of the time, and religious nursing homes indicate such an affiliation on
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their home page 62 percent of the time. These rates suggest much more
frequent and prominent signaling of religious affiliation than nonprofit
affiliation.
An alternative baseline for judging nonprofit signaling by hospitals
is the rate at which academic hospitals signal their academic status.
Academic hospitals fail to communicate this status on their Web sites
in 68 percent of cases and in yellow pages listings in 80 percent of cases.
A comparison of these numbers with the roughly 40 percent and 93
percent noncommunication rates, respectively, for nonprofit status sug-
gests that academic centers signal that status at rates no higher than
nonprofits signal their status. This finding does not, however, provide a
great deal of support for the signaling theory. It is possible that being
an academic center is no better a signal of quality than is nonprofit
status. Consumers may view such a hospital as the place where young,
lower quality doctors are in training. Moreover, academic status is a
baseline only for hospitals. Neither nursing homes nor child care pro-
viders have academic affiliations.
An alternative baseline specifically for child care providers is the rate
at which these facilities signal accreditation from a state or other agency.
Accredited providers fail to mention their accreditation in yellow pages
listings in only 21 percent of cases. This finding suggests a much higher
rate of signaling than that for nonprofit status. And unlike religious or
academic status, accreditation is unambiguously a signal of better quality
service, much as the signaling theory suggests nonprofit status is.15
A concern with using either religious status or academic status (for
hospitals) as a baseline is that there may be substitution among signals.16
This substitution may take two forms. First, because religious and ac-
ademic affiliations tend to be nonprofit,17 firms that are religious or
15. A fourth possible baseline is the rate at which for-profit firms communicate their
quality. The problem with this comparison is that the baseline modifies not just the signal
but also the organizational form of the firm. If the two firms behave differently, the baseline
will be contaminated. Another problem is that our hospital and nursing home data include
only nonprofit firms. So it is possible to compute this baseline only for child care providers’
yellow pages listings. As is reported in Table 3, accredited for-profit firms are more likely
to signal their accreditation (80 percent) than nonprofit firms are to signal their accredi-
tation (69 percent) or their nonprofit status.
16. Accreditation of child care providers is negatively correlated with nonprofit status. Of
the 43 accredited facilities in our yellow pages sample, 30 were for profit (see Table 3).
17. According to data from the American Hospital Association, the odds of a religious
hospital being nonprofit is 350 to 1. (Of 757 religious hospitals in that database, only 2
were for profit.) The odds of a hospital affiliated with a medical school being nonprofit is
9 to 1. (Of 997 hospitals that were affiliated with a medical school, 892 are nonprofit,
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academic signal they are nonprofit merely by signaling they are religious
or academic. This is a plausible interpretation, but not a necessary one.
An alternative is that religious or academic firms would like to signal
their religious or academic status but not that they are nonprofit. A
second form of substitution is that religious or academic status signals
not nonprofit status but rather the same quality that nonprofit status
signals. In that case, firms that are religious or academic may not need
to signal that they are nonprofit to signal to consumers that they provide
nonobservable quality.
We address these complications from using religious or academic
firms as baselines for nonprofit firms in a simple way. We ask whether
nonreligious firms or nonacademic firms are more likely than religious
firms or academic firms, respectively, to signal their nonprofit status. The
pro-nonprofit-signaling view of both forms of substitution suggests the
answer should be yes. Assuming that religious status and academic status
do not alter a firm’s view of the quality-signaling value of nonprofit
status, communicating religious or academic affiliation also communi-
cates nonprofit status only if nonreligious firms and nonacademic firms
signal nonprofit status at a higher rate than do religious firms and ac-
ademic firms, respectively. Likewise, if firms that are religious or aca-
demic do not need to signal quality via nonprofit status, then nonreli-
gious firms and nonacademic firms should employ the nonprofit signal
at a higher rate than do religious firms and academic firms, respectively.
To check this, Table 4 gives the difference in the probability with
which hospitals or nursing homes with and without certain features
signal their nonprofit status on various Web pages. Religious hospitals
are less likely (7.8 percent) to signal nonprofit status on their about-
us page. Academic hospitals (measured by whether they are on the As-
sociation of American Medical School’s Council of Teaching Hospitals,
are affiliated with a medical school, have 20 or more residents or interns
training at the facility, or any of the above) are less likely to signal
nonprofit status on their home page but more likely to signal it on their
about-us page. (Overall, however, there is no significant difference in
which implies an odds ratio of 9 to 1.) Similarly, of 249 hospitals on the Association of
American Medical School’s Council of Teaching Hospitals, only 12 are for profit, which
implies an odds ratio of nearly 20 to 1. Of 431 hospitals with 20 or more residents or
interns, only 20 were for profit, which implies an odds ratio of more than 20 to 1. According
to our yellow pages data, the odds of a religious child care facility being nonprofit are
more than 10 to 1. (From the data in Table 3, it is apparent that of 202 religious child
care providers, only 17 were for profit.)
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their propensity to signal anywhere on their Web sites. Moreover, our
analysis may be biased toward finding substitution specifically on home
pages because of the space constraints on that page. The mere fact of
signaling academic status reduces space available for and thus the prob-
ability of signaling nonprofit status on a home page.) If we combine
academic and religious measures, we find that nonreligious, nonacademic
hospitals are no more likely to signal nonprofit status than are other
hospitals. Finally, we find results similar to academic status when we
employ plausible quality-related characteristics other than religious or
academic status. These include participation in Blue Cross, having a
long-term plan for quality improvement, or being community oriented.
The results for nursing homes are even less supportive of the nonprofit
signaling theory. Being religious or having some other quality-related
characteristic has no significant association with the propensity to in-
dicate nonprofit status on a hospital’s Web site.
The usual caveat to univariate analyses is that they may lead to
spurious correlations. For example, if academic affiliation is correlated
with location in the eastern region, and location in the eastern region
is responsible for the signaling behavior, we would draw the wrong
conclusion from the data in Table 4. Therefore, we estimated a multi-
variate logistic regression in which the dependent variable is the most
prominent Web page on which a nonprofit facility communicates its
status. The independent variables include measures of quality and char-
acteristics such as size, scope, system affiliation, and region. We also
include controls for the market concentration in and nonprofit share of
the local market (defined as the county). The rationale for including a
measure of concentration (the Herfindahl-Hirschman index) is that if
nonprofit status is a signal of quality, this signal is not necessary in
markets where a facility enjoys a near monopoly anyway, that is, markets
with high market concentration. The rationale for including nonprofit
share is that if all firms are nonprofit, there is no need to signal nonprofit
status because it would not differentiate a facility from its competitors.18
The results, which are reported as odds ratios in Table 5, suggest that
nonprofit hospitals are half as likely to communicate their status on their
about-us page if they are religious. They are also less likely to com-
municate their status on pages other than their home or about-us pages
18. Although our samples of hospitals and nursing homes are limited to nonprofits,
the nonprofit share and Herfindahl-Hirschman covariates track for-profit and public
competitors.
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if they are affiliated with a medical school, but they are more likely to
do so if they have 20 or more residents or interns.19 Finally, hospitals
that participate in Blue Cross plans are less likely to communicate their
status anywhere on their Web sites. Other quality characteristics, the
market concentration, and the nonprofit market share, however, do not
appear to influence such communication. As for nursing homes, only
religious homes appear significantly to signal their nonprofit status, but
only elsewhere on a Web site. These results, which are robust to different
specifications of covariates (including dropping any covariates that cor-
relate with quality characteristics, cannibalize the sample size, state fixed
effects, or have different weighting schemes), suggest that there is some,
but not overwhelming, substitution between nonprofit signaling and sub-
stitute characteristics.20
It is possible, of course, that religious or academic firms that do not
signal their status have the same demand for a nonprofit signal as firms
that are not religious or academic. Failure to account for this may yield
an underestimate of the demand for nonprofit signaling by firms. We
address this by adding indicators of quality signals (as opposed to simply
indicators of quality characteristics). Specifically, we interacted indica-
tors for whether a firm is, for example, religious with an indicator for
whether a firm indicated it is religious on its Web site. The coefficient
on the interaction term reveals whether religious firms that indicated
they are religious were less likely to indicate they are nonprofit than
were other firms. Although the results are not reported in our tables,
we found that religious hospitals that signal their religious status on
their home pages are less likely to signal their nonprofit status on their
home pages but only if the analysis does not weight for sampling prob-
abilities. This finding supports the nonprofit signaling theory. Both re-
ligious hospitals and nursing homes that did not signal their religious
19. Because teaching hospitals, medical schools, and residency programs are correlated,
it is hard to explain the discrepancy between signaling by the three types of hospitals
elsewhere on a Web site. To address possible multicolinearity, although it cannot explain
our results, we estimated a model that substituted for these three indicators a single in-
dicator for whether a facility was a teaching hospital, was affiliated with a medical school,
or had 20 or more residents or interns. We found no significant association with this
variable. The odds ratio in the “elsewhere” regression was .614 ( ).pp .15
20. There are some striking results in Table 5 that do not bear directly upon the
nonprofit signaling theory but deserve comment. In particular, hospitals in the South and
West are three to five times more likely to signal their nonprofit status in a prominent
manner than are hospitals in the East. This finding cannot entirely be explained by the
higher prevalence of nonprofits in the East, since the nonprofit share variable controls for
that explanation.
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status on their about-us pages, however, were less (not more) likely to
signal their nonprofit status on their about-us pages. This finding is
contrary to the nonprofit signaling theory. Thus, the already limited
evidence for substitution becomes muddied when we account not merely
for religious status but for whether firms signal their religious status.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper examines whether nonprofit firms in hospital, nursing home,
and child care markets communicate their status to consumers. That
they do is a key assumption of the theory that nonprofit status is a signal
of noncontractible quality. Our analysis of firms’ Web sites and yellow
pages listings suggests that nonprofits frequently do not communicate
their status. We account for the possibility that religious or academic
firms have less need to signal that they are nonprofit. But doing this did
not dramatically change our findings. Overall, we find limited support
for the nonprofit signaling theory.
There are important limitations to our analysis, some of which sug-
gest directions for future research. First, we test whether nonprofits send
a signal, not whether consumers receive that signal. (We review literature
that examines what consumers think about nonprofits but not whether
consumers know firms’ nonprofit status.) It would be helpful to conduct
a survey to determine whether consumers are able to guess accurately
the nonprofit status of their hospitals, nursing homes, or child care pro-
viders. Second, our analysis does not examine certain modes of com-
munication that are as significant as yellow pages listings and Web sites.
These include word-of-mouth, radio and TV advertising, and other print
media such as newspapers and magazines. It would be useful to extend
our analysis to data on these media. Third, although our methodology
could easily be extended to other markets with mixed for-profit and
nonprofit production, it cannot be extended to pure nonprofit markets,
such as charities. In these markets firms may take nonprofit status to
signal quality but do not have to communicate their status because all
firms are nonprofit and consumers know it.
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